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sulted who can draw and attend execution of a codicil or a new will
making such bequest. The final alternative is to advise the client at the
outset to seek independent counsel.
Conclusion
In Collentine, the Wisconsin Supreme Court goes further than other
jurisdictions by departing from the traditional notions of rebuttable pre-
sumptions with regard to undue influence in cases of attorneys-benefici-
aries and by establishing a conclusive presumption which invalidates the
entire will. In doing this, the court may have upset the delicate balance
between ethical limitations and practical flexibility in that the line of
demarcation beyond which the presumption of unprofessional conduct
becomes conclusive is not clearly drawn.
MICHAEL C. ELMER
Criminal Law: Evidence-Use of a Hypothetical Question-
In the case of Rice v. State,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the nature and use of the hypothetical question in a
criminal trial, on both the direct examination of the defense's expert
witness and on the cross-examination of the state's expert witness. The
defendant was accused of first degree murder. A statement of the
facts and circumstances leading to the shooting and death of the vic-
tim is necessary to understand the import of the hypothetical questions
which were asked during the trial.
After a series of fights between the deceased and certain patrons
of defendant Rice's bar, Rice and the deceased became involved in an
altercation which resulted in the deceased being hit about the head
a few times. The deceased was then carried out of the tavern and laid
on a concrete area outside the bar. Rice then took a shotgun from be-
hind the bar and walked to where the deceased was lying and shot
him in the face. A post mortem examination of the deceased was con-
ducted by a pathologist at the hospital. The pathologist testified at trial
that he concluded, from the autopsy that he had performed, that the
cause of death was "trauma and blood loss essentially due to [a] shot-
gun blast which destroyed the lower half of the face.",2 The evidence
introduced during the trial showed that in the fights which had oc-
curred prior to the shooting, the deceased had been beaten about the
head in one or more of them. The evidence also disclosed that during
one of these fights the deceased had struck his head on the corner of
a table. The pathologist testified on direct examination that the trauma
and blood loss resulted in a cardio-vascular collapse which caused the
death of the deceased. The pathologist had drawn his conclusions as
138 Wis. 2d 344, 156 N.W.2d 409 (1968).2 Id. at 349, 156 N.W.2d at 412.
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to the cause of death from the information he had received when the
deceased was brought to the hospital. The only information available
to the pathologist, however, was the fact that the deceased had been
shot in the face. The pathologist knew nothing of the fights prior to
the shooting.
On cross-examination of the pathologist, the defense counsel at-
tempted to elicit a concession from the doctor that his autopsy would
have been different if he had known of the series of fights in which
the deceased had been struck about the head. The trial court sustained
the state's objection to this question on the basis that there was no
foundation in the record on which to predicate such a question.
The defense counsel then posed a hypothetical question to the patho-
logist which referred to all of the alleged events leading up to the
death of the deceased, and in conclusion asked the pathologist if he
would have performed a pathological examination of the brain if he
had known of these events. The court again sustained the state's ob-
jection to the question, stating that "[T]he hypothetical basis of the
question is too complex to have included all the elements testified to in
the record so that it might be considered impossible for the doctor-
pathologist to have an answer [i.e., a competent opinion] under the
evidence that hasn't been satisfactorily established for the question."3
During the pathologist's testimony he did admit that the cardio-vascular
collapse could have resulted from a brain injury.
The defense counsel on direct examination of its own expert witness
again attempted to use the same hypothetical question it had used on
cross-examination of the state's expert witness. The trial court again
sustained the state's objection to the question, ruling that no competent
opinion could be rendered without some reference to the force of the
blows to the head.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, (1) the trial
court abused its discetion in limiting the scope of the defendant's cross-
examination of the state's medical expert; and, (2) the trial court erred
in limiting the defendant's direct examination of its own medical ex-
pert.4
Scope of Cross-Examination
Prior to this case the rule had been that:
[G]reat liberty and latitude are allowed in cross-examination
of expert witnesses. However, the applications of this rule are
often directed to such matters as the education of the expert
3 Id. at 351, 156 N.W.2d at 412.
4 Even though the court found error, it did not reverse the conviction. The
court concluded that it was impossible to believe that death resulted from
some other cause, deciding that any errors in the trial did not affect any of
the substantial rights of the defendant. The court also said that the errors
were not prejudicial to the defendant and that the evidence in the trial was
sufficient to sustain a verdict of first degree murder.
1969-70]
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witness, his practical experience, the extent of his observation
outside his own work, as well as other cognate matters bearing
directly on his ability as an expert. Upon such examination,
hypothetical questions may go outside the record for the pur-
pose of testing the skill of the witness.5
This rule can be classified as the "half-open door" type of cross-
examination,6 i.e., the cross-examination extends to any matters except
the cross-examiner's own case.
The defense attorney in Rice, however, was not only testing the
skill and knowledge of the expert witness in his cross-examination of
him, but was also attempting to attack the opinion of the expert as to
the cause of death. The court, citing Delap v. Liebenson7 stated that:
When it comes to cross-examination of such expert witnesses,
however, the rule is not so limited, and, within the field of the
trial court's reasonable discretion, questions may properly be
framed assuming quite a different state of facts than those ap-
pearing in the record for the purpose of testing the knowledge
and skill of such witness and the weight to be given to his
testimony.8
It is a well-established principle that there should be a wide latitude
allowed in the cross-examination of a witness in a criminal trial.
Opportunity should be allowed for a thorough and sifting
cross-examination which should be neither unduly restricted nor
abridged and must be allowed a range as wide as the direct
examination. Cross-examination should be allowed to extend to
anything which is relevant to show the improbability of the direct
evidence.
A wide latitude is permitted especially in capital cases. The
court should never interpose except when there is a manifest
abuse of the right of cross-examination as to facts in issue or
relevant to the issue.
It is sometimes stated that reasonable cross-examination
must be allowed. This, however, in practice generally amounts
to the same privilege as the allowance of the wide latitude, since
without such range, the examining party has not been allowed
the reasonable exercise of his right to cross-examine. 9
This wide latitude in cross-examination is particularly necessary
in a murder trial when the expert witness has given, on direct ex-
amination, his opinion as to the cause of death. The hypothetical ques-
tion is the only way the defendant's counsel can attack the conclusion
5 Simpson v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 195, 206, 145 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1966) (footnotes
omitted). See also Shurpit v. Breh, 30 Wis. 2d 388, 141 N.W2d 266 (1966);
Delap v. Liebenson, 190 Wis. 73, 208 N.W. 937 (1926) ; Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d
6 (1960); 2 B. JQNES, EVIDENCE § 437, (5th ed. 1958).
6 C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 21 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]...
7 190 Wis. 73, 208 N.W. 937 (1926).
8 Id. at 82, 208 N.W. at 941 (emphasis supplied by the Rice court).
9 3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 861, at 242 (12th ed. 1955).
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of the expert witness. The hypothetical question need not include all
the facts on the record, but the expert must not be questioned on a
situation having no foundation in the facts presented. He may, how-
ever, be questioned on the facts which the cross-examiner claims he
proved, provided such examination is confined to the possible or prob-
able range of the facts. "A hypothetical question need not assume as
proved all facts which the evidence in the case tends to prove, but only
those which tend to be proved and on the basis of which the correct
answer is sought.' ' 10 In the civil cases of Zoldoske v. State," and, more
recently, Sharp v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.,1 the court
applied the rule which the Rice court applied to criminal cases. In the
Sharp case the court said, "[A] hypothetical question need not state
all the facts in evidence in the case 'but only those needed to allow the
expert to provide a correct answer on the theory advocated by the
questioner's side of the case.' ",13
This rule, coupled with the reasoning that, "The purpose of a hypo-
thetical question is to give the jury the benefit of an expert opinion
upon one or another of several situations which may be found to exist
in the evidence,"' 4 brings the Rice decision into perspective. In Rice
there were two conflicting theories as to the cause of death. The state
contended that death was caused by the gunshot to the face. The de-
fendant contended, however, that the death could have been caused by a
brain injury sustained by the deceased in a fight prior to the shooting.
[W]here there are conflicting theories in a case and evidence
to support each theory, counsel in propounding a hypothetical
question to an expert may select any hypothesis fairly supported
by the evidence and call for the conclusion of the expert wit-
ness upon the basis of the facts stated in the hypothetical ques-
tion. 5
The purpose of the defense counsel's question to the state's medical
expert was not only to elicit from him the possibility of a cause of death
different from that which he stated on direct, but also to impeach his
opinion and to affect the weight which the jury would give to his testi-
mony. 6 The impeachment of the medical expert's opinion would be
20 Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 77, 117 N.W.2d
646, 652 (1962).
"82 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892).
12 18 Wis. 2d 467, 118 N.W.2d 905 (1962).
1 Id. at 477, 118 N.W.2d at 910. See also Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber
Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W.2d 646 (1962); Balthazor v. State, 207 Wis. 172,
240 N.W. 776 (1936).
'4 Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber Co., 18 Wis. 2d 67, 77, 117 N.W.2d
646, 652 (1962).
'5 Balthazor v. State, 207 Wis. 172, 191, 240 N.W. 776, 783 (1932). See also
State v. Cohen, 31 Wis. 2d 97, 142 N.W.2d 161 (1966).
16 See, Wis. JURY INSTRUcTONS-CRImINAL, No. 200 and No. 205. These are the
-jury instructions given when expert testimony is used and when the expert
testifies to certain questions which have been proposed by the use of a hypo-
1969-70]
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accomplished by showing what his normal procedure would be in the
situation propounded by the cross-examiner The pathologist's admis-
sion that he would have done a pathology of the brain had he known
of the prior fight would diminish the weight which the jury would have
given to his opinion on direct examination as to the cause of death.
There is one drawback to the court's expansion of the scope of
cross-examination. The court, it seems, has abrogated the half-open-
door type of cross-examination and has unconsciously adopted the tra-
ditional English rule of wide-open cross-examination. This rule allows
the cross-examiner to pose questions not only about subjects brought
out in direct examination, but about any subject relevant to any of the
issues of the case, including any facts and opinions which relate solely
to the cross-examiner's own case and defenses.' 7
To determine whether the court has in fact opened the door the
whole way and allowed a wide-open type of cross-examination, it is
necessary to view the decision in the light of the three main functions
of cross-examination: "(1) to shed light on the credibility of the direct
testimony; (2) to bring out additional facts related to those elicited on
direct examination, and (3) in states following the wide-open rule, to
bring out additional facts which tend to elucidate any issue in the
case." ' These functions must then be measured against a standard of
relevancy. There is no doubt that in the second function the standard
of relevancy applied is the same as on direct examination. Nor is there
any question as to which standard is used in the wide-open type of
cross-examination. The standard of relevancy is the same as that used
for direct examination. But as to the first function-that of testing
credibility-it seems that a different standard of relevancy must be
applied, since the purpose of the cross-examination is different from
that of direct examination.
"The test of relevancy [in impeachment of the witness' credi-
bility] is not whether the answer sought will elucidate any of
the main issues, but whether it will to a useful extent aid the
court or jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and
assessing the probative value of the direct testimony."' 19
This test of relevancy is the one used in the half-open-door type of
cross-examination when the cross-examiner is attempting merely to im-
peach the witness by establishing discrepancies or inconsistencies in
his testimony. But as said before, this standard is not applied when the
wide-open type of cross-examination is used. In the wide-open type
thetical question. These instructions explain to the jury the weight which
should be given to the testimony of the expert witness based on a hypothetical
question.
17 MCCORMICK § 21.18 Id. § 29, at 54.
19 Id. at 55.
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of cross-examination the standard of relevancy applied is the same as
that applied on direct examination. 20 Therefore, if it can be determined
what test of relevancy the court applied, it is possible by inductive
reasoning to determine what type of cross-examination the court is
allowing.
Even though the Rice court states that
"[Q]uestions may properly be framed assuming quite a different
state of facts than those appearing in the record for the purpose
of testing the knowledge and skill of such witness and the weight
to be given to his testimony."21
it does not follow the rule. If the court had determined that the ques-
tion was for impeachment purposes, it should have applied as the test
.of relevancy not whether the answer sought wauld elucidate any of
the material issues, but whether it would to a useful extent aid the
court or jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing
the probative value of the direct testimony. If this standard of relevancy
had been applied, the hypothetical question would not have been per-
missible, because the main purpose of the question was to elucidate one
of the naterial defensive issues of the case, i.e., the cause of death.
Once the court deemed the question permissible, the only conclusion
which can be drawn is that the court applied the standard of relevancy
which is applied on direct examination. Therefore, the scope of cross-
examination must be the wide-open type, i.e., the traditional English
rule.
By permitting this type of cross-examination, the court allows the
defendant to put on his case in chief under the guise of impeachment.
This is contrary to the normal order of proof in the trial and conse-
quently permits the defendant to complete his defense before the state
can finish with its proof.
The ability of the cross-examiner to put on his case in chief before
the state has finished brings about another problem. If the court does
not exercise some discretion in controlling the hypothetical question of
the cross-examiner, the jury may become confused. It cannot be denied
that the hypothetical question is a very effective means of presenting
an opinion of the expert to the jury, but it may be abused by the cross-
examiner. A clever advocate may word the question in such a way that
the expert may be barred from giving his exact opinion in the case.
A misleading answer may be educed when the expert is forced to
answer the question in the context in which it is framed. This tends
to bring about confusion in the minds of the jury in determining pre-
cisely what weight should be given to the testimony. Consequently, the
2 0 MCCORMICK, § 29, at 55.
2138 Wis. 2d 344, 354, 156 N.W2d 409, 414 (1968).
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jury may be prohibited from receiving the best opinion the expert could
have given.
Direct Examination of the Expert
The Rice decision also expanded the use of the hypothetical ques-
tion on direct examination of the defense's expert witness. Use of the
hypothetical question propounded to the expert was not permitted be-
cause the question called for speculation on the part of the witness as
to the severity of the blows to the victim's head. The supreme court,
however, said that the description of the blows was sufficient to support
an inference from which the doctor could formulate an opinion as to
whether or not such head injuries could have caused the death. In a
civil trial, when the hypothetical question requires an answer based on
conjecture, the question will not be allowed. The supreme court in
Rice, however, would not apply this rule to criminal trials. The reason
for allowing the question is that in a criminal trial there is a different
burden of proof than in a civil trial. In a civil trial, of course, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a claim. But in the absence of
affirmative defenses, the defendant in a criminal trial has no burden of
proof whatsoever because of the presumption of innocence. The issue
on the burden of proof presented in a criminal trial is not whether the
defendant disproved his commission of the crime charged but whether
the state proved his commission of it beyond a reasonable doubt.
The question propounded on direct examination was basically the
same as that asked on cross-examination, i.e., it contained both con-
troverted facts and also omitted certain facts. The supreme court
applied the same reasoning in allowing the question on direct examina-
tion as it applied in allowing it on cross-examination. The basis for
this reasoning was that even though the hypothetical question may
omit certain facts, such facts can be elicited by cross-examination. 22
Since any problem can be cleared up by cross-examination and re-
direct, the opinions based on conflicting inferences and those based on
questions which have omitted certain material facts now become ques-
tions for the jury. The jury must decide the weight to be accorded
to the expert's opinion. Thus, the court is now allowing the use of
hypothetical questions on direct by giving the questioner a narrower
foundation on which to ask his question.
22 Rausch v. Buisse, 33 Wis. 2d 154, 146 N.W.2d 801 (1966). In this case the
court stated that "[A] party has a right to an opinion of an expert witness
on the facts which that party claims to be the facts of the case. This rule
is subject to the limitation that the questions which unfairly select part of the
established facts or which omit material parts should be rejected. However,
the normal rule is that any disadvantage to the defendant by the hypothetical
question should be remedied on cross-examination." Id. at 169, 146 N.W.2d
at 809.
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Conclusion
It seems that the court in Rice has inadvertently eliminated the
rule that restricts the scope of cross-examination and by implication
has adopted Rule 105 of the Model Code of Evidence.2 3 This rule makes
the scope of cross-examination a matter of the trial court's discretion.
Adoption of Rule 105 should allow an orderly trial without placing
a restriction on the extent of the witness' admissible testimony on
either direct or cross-examination. The rule also preserves our partisan
witness form of advocacy. Such preservation is necessary because the
adoption of the wide-open type of cross-examination would in effect
eliminate the normal rules of evidence as to the foundation for com-
petency, the partisan witness rule and the order of trial. The state's
witness becomes a witness for both the prosecution and the defense.
2 4
LESLIE J. MLAKAR
Torts-Negligence-Recovery for Emotional Trauma: In
Dillon v. Legg,' a mother brought a negligence action against the driver
of an automobile that struck and killed her infant daughter. She alleged
that because she had witnessed the accident, and because she had feared
for the safety of her child, she sustained great emotional disturbance,
shock, and injury to her nervous system. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant. The issue presented on appeal
to the state supreme court was whether tort liability may be predicated
on emotional trauma and attendant bodily illness that have been induced
by apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury to a closely
related person. In a 4 to 3 decision, the supreme court recognized the
mother's cause of action.
With one exception,' the courts since 1930 have denied recovery un-
23 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 105 (1942) :
The judge controls the conduct of the trial to the end -that the evidence
shall be presented honestly, expeditiously and in such form as to be readily
understood, and in his discretion, among other things . . .
(h) to what extent and in what circumstances a party cross-examining
a witness may be forbidden to examine him concerning material matters
not inquired about on a previous examination by the judge or by the
adverse party ....
24 Neider v. Spoehr, 41 Wis. 2d 610, 165 N.W.2d 171 (1969), a civil case
handed down after the Rice decision, the supreme court ruled that the scope
of cross-examination was a matter of the trial court's discretion. In Boller v.
Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N.W.2d 129 (1969), another civil case, the
court expressly adopted Rule 105(h) of the Model Code of Evidence. The
court indicated that the rule should be applied in both civil and criminal
trials.168 Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)2 1n Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937), aff'd on re-
hearing, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938), the plaintiff was sold poisoned
feed for his dairy cows. He suffered a mental breakdown and eventual death
induced by his fear for the safety of those to whom he had sold milk. The
high degree of care imposed on those who handle poison, as well as a product
liability aspect, diminishes the applicability of the case to automobile fact
situations.
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